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How School Quality Impacts Housing Values: Some Regional Evidence 
John Reifel, Ph.D., Associate Dean, Department of Economics, Seidman College of Business
Paul Thorsnes, Ph.D. Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand
Introduction
Most consumer goods have to stand the test of the market; 
firms that price too high or produce goods of a quality that 
is too low generally fair poorly. One might think that the 
goods and services supplied by local governments avoid 
the market test because governments can force us to pay 
for them through our taxes. But Charles Tiebout, in an 
influential article published in 1956, showed how local public 
goods and services, such as public schools, police, and local 
environmental quality, also have to withstand the rigors of 
the market.
The idea is simple. Like private businesses, local governments 
decide the quantity and quality of the goods and services they 
supply to their customers; i.e., their constituents, and pay for 
these goods and services at least in part with revenues from 
local income, sales, and property taxes (they also receive 
payments from higher levels of government). If a householder 
doesn’t like the combination of public services and taxes 
chosen by his elected representatives, he can either lobby for 
change or pick up and move to another service district. If 
enough people move out of a district, house prices fall, tax 
revenues decline, and local officials find themselves in much 
the same position as a private business that has made some 
mistakes: revenues are below expectation and shareholders 
are upset.
Tiebout hypothesized that if households are mobile enough 
to be able to shop around for service districts in which to 
live, then market pressure will be brought to bear on the 
local agencies that supply the services. Those who want more 
safety, cleaner streets, and higher quality public schools and 
are able and willing to pay the higher local taxes required 
will locate in cities that provide that mix. The market thereby 
enforces discipline on local government agencies much as it 
does on private businesses.
Of interest is the extent to which Tiebout’s hypothesis holds 
water. Tests of household sorting by preferences for public 
services can be either direct or indirect. The direct approach 
involves surveys to see if householders’ preferences about the 
quality and level of public services and taxes are relatively 
similar within service districts and different across service 
districts. The indirect approach takes advantage of the house-
price differentials that Tiebout sorting generates. Households 
bid up house prices in districts that provide desirable 
combinations of public services and taxes. So differences 
across cities in the selling prices of otherwise similar houses 
indirectly indicates Tiebout sorting.
The GR/EGR Housing Price Differential
We test for Tiebout sorting using both the indirect and direct 
approaches by collecting both house price and survey data 
from an unusual subdivision. The subdivision, called Ottawa 
Hills, was platted in the early 1920s, occupies a nearly square 
area of 160 acres, and contains 448 houses. The property was 
a golf course prior to development, and its uniquely curved 
streets were influenced by the original fairways. The original 
lots in the subdivision were marketed to relatively well-
heeled households, and the deeds included requirements for 
minimum amounts to be spent on construction of the house. 
The high quality of the houses and neighborhood distinguish 
the subdivision from its somewhat older neighbors.
But it isn’t the subdivision’s high quality that attracted us, it’s 
that the subdivision is neatly divided in half by municipal 
and public school district boundaries. The subdivision is 
bounded on its north and south sides by Franklin and Hall 
and on its west and east sides by Giddings and Plymouth. The 
boundary between the cities and school districts of Grand 
Rapids (GR) and East Grand Rapids (EGR) evenly divide the 
subdivision into two rectangular 80-acre parcels. Thus, we 
have the opportunity to observe what has happened over a 
long and interesting period of time to sets of very similar 
houses in what are, at this point, very different public service 
districts. To put it more technically, the subdivision allows 
an unusually high level of control over the many house and 
neighborhood characteristics that influence house prices.
We started by collecting data on house characteristics. 
Information about the characteristics of the 448 houses in 
the neighborhood was obtained from the Assessors’ Offices 
in GR and EGR. Examination of that data led us to select a 
sample of 100 similar houses on which we could concentrate 
our study, 50 in GR and 50 in EGR. All of the sample houses 
were built between 1923 and 1935, have two stories, at least 
three bedrooms, brick veneer, and significant amounts of 
ornamental trim. None of the houses are on the relatively 
busy boundary streets and all are located north of Alexander 
Road, since those built south of Alexander on the EGR side 
are often newer and consist of more diverse architectural 
styles. For the 100 houses in the sample, detailed information 
was obtained on year built, lot size, floor space, number of 
bathrooms, and garage size. Assessor records were also used 
to update floor space due to renovations over time.
We then collected sale prices on the sample of houses. Price 
data can be obtained from public records kept on file in 
the County building, but is difficult to access. Fortunately, 
TransNation Title Insurance Company has the data in a 
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more user-friendly format and agreed to let us peruse their 
records and, as important, provided expert advice into how 
to interpret the information on the records. We were able to 
go back as far as 1949. Two of the houses did not sell over 
the 53-year period, so they were dropped from the sample. 
We found 359 arms-length (buyer and seller having different 
surnames) sales for the 98 houses over the 1949–2002 period, 
an average of 3.6 sales per house and almost 7 sales per year. 
It surprised us that the rate of sales per year changed very 
little over the 53-year time period.
The 1949 to 2002 time period is almost ideal for our 
purposes. Grand Rapids expanded to provide urban services 
to most unincorporated developing areas until the early 
1960s. Ironically, suburban service districts were less 
important when Tiebout published his paper than they are 
now. This changed in the 1960s, when many households took 
advantage of highway improvements to move to suburban 
areas, thereby making room for an influx of relatively poor 
households into the generally older central-city houses and 
neighborhoods. Economists refer to this process as “filtering:” 
houses tend to filter to relatively poorer households as 
they age (the same thing happens with cars). Because 
those moving to suburban areas preferred to form their 
own services districts, the migration pattern created fiscal 
distress for central cities that resulted in a relative decline 
in the quality of the services they could provide. Thus, the 
public services supplied to each side of the subdivision were 
probably of similar quality prior to the 1960s, and have 
probably differed since. Of interest is the corresponding 
response in house prices.
Using statistical regression analysis, we constructed price 
indices for a house with a standard set of characteristics on 
each side of the subdivision. The price indices reveal that this 
standard house sold for about the same amount on both sides 
of the boundary up through the mid-1960s, consistent with 
our hypothesis that the packages of city services and taxes 
were about the same in GR and EGR at that time. Toward the 
end of the 1960s, houses on the EGR side started rising in 
price. In the mid-1970s house prices on the GR side began to 
rise parallel to those in EGR. Since house prices on the EGR 
side had begun rising earlier, they were selling at a premium. 
That premium has varied around 40% of the price of a typical 
house on the GR side, and the premium has persisted through 
2002. The average selling prices for a typical house in the 
early 2000s was about $259,000 on the GR side and about 
$358,000 on the EGR side. The premium to live in EGR, just a 
short walk away across an invisible line, is close to $100,000!
What does this premium signify? If the houses and 
neighborhoods on each side of the boundary are indeed of 
similar quality, then the premium appears to represent the 
market value of the differences in public services and taxes 
across the boundary. It turns out that tax rates are lower on 
the GR side, even though city residents pay a city income tax 
in addition to property taxes. So, for the households in this 
market, the value of the difference in the quality of city and 
school district services apparently exceeds $100,000!
Household Preferences
The price differential, taken by itself, provides indirect 
evidence of Tiebout sorting. Householders who value, 
especially highly, the public goods and services offered in 
East Grand Rapids compete for houses in EGR by bidding up 
their prices. Conversely, households who have less interest in 
the characteristics of EGR public goods and services can get a 
significant price break on the similarly nice houses in the GR 
side of the Ottawa Hills subdivision.
We wanted to look more directly at the characteristics of 
the households on each side of the subdivision. We started 
by looking at the demographic characteristics reported in 
the 2000 census block data. We expected to see significant 
differences; for example, young and childless households and 
retired couples might find the general location and house 
quality desirable, but balk at the higher taxes and house prices 
in EGR. Census demographics are almost identical on both 
sides of the subdivision. The only difference is slightly more 
racial diversity on the GR side. This is puzzling and a bit 
troubling because researchers often use census demographics 
as indicative of preferences to test Tiebout hypotheses.
We thought we might solve the puzzle by asking households 
about their preferences. We sent a mail survey to 200 
households, 100 on each side of the city boundary asking 
about their preferences for key public services and why they 
chose to live where they do. The 200 households consist of 
the 100 whose houses were in the housing price analysis, and 
another 100 households (50 on each side) selected randomly 
from the north half of the subdivision. Response rates were 
unusually high — 72% in GR and 68% in EGR.
Almost all of the EGR respondents reported that they 
were attracted by the combination of high quality houses, 
neighborhoods, and city services. Over 80% of the 
respondents reported that they had selected their houses in 
part so that they could send their children to the high quality 
EGR public schools. This behavior is exactly what Tiebout 
would expect: the city and school district are supplying a 
set of services that appeal to a segment of the population 
attracted to the types of houses and neighborhoods in EGR. 
Taxes are high, but the high house prices indicate that both 
current and potential residents consider them well spent.
The responses on the GR side reveal some similarities, but 
also some glaring differences. As in EGR, almost all the 
respondents were attracted by the high quality houses and 
attractive neighborhood. Unlike EGR, many commented 
on the relatively low price for the house and neighborhood 
package. Some were attracted by the relative diversity in the 
neighborhood and many like the strong sense of community 
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in the neighborhood. Of interest, however, is that about 60% 
of the households with children chose to send them most of 
the time, to parochial schools (compared to less than 10% 
in EGR). Most of these households reported that proximity 
to parochial schools was an important attraction of the 
neighborhood. About a third of those who sent their children 
to public schools did so in the 1950s and 1960s, before the 
decline of public school quality. Those currently with school-
age children often send them to GR public magnet schools 
rather than to a neighborhood public school.
We see these results as rather strong and interesting evidence 
of Tiebout sorting. The similar houses and neighborhoods 
on each side of the boundary attract demographically similar 
households, but the households who choose the GR side tend 
to have weaker preferences especially for the characteristics 
of EGR schools. Some of these households are retired or 
childless. Many value the proximity to parochial or public 
magnet schools. The market appears to have worked to 
accommodate these differing preferences.
The Housing Price Differential Revisited
But what about the differences in the quality of city services?  
It turns out that the residents on the GR side have formed 
an active neighborhood association. The association lobbies 
the city government for prompt delivery of public services, 
conducts neighborhood clean-up campaigns, and holds an 
annual neighborhood party, among other activities. The 
quality of these services may not quite match those of EGR, 
but they make up much of the difference.
These conclusions have implications for the interpretation 
of the $100,000 house-price differential. The quality of the 
services actually consumed by the households on the GR 
side appears to roughly match that of the services on the 
EGR side. Many of the households on the GR side make 
tuition payments that are avoided by EGR residents. The 
price differential compensates for these payments — the 
higher cost of obtaining high-quality services on the GR side 
capitalizes into house prices. This means, of course, that the 
market value of the difference in the quality of GR and EGR 
public services is even bigger than we initially thought: those 
households willing to send their children to tuition-charging 
schools were able to outbid those willing to consume GR 
public services. The price differential would be bigger in 
the absence of the parochial and magnet schools, though we 
cannot tell how much bigger.
1 C.M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416–424 (1956).
2 We are indebted to Monte Reinert, Eilleen Mueller, and members of the staff at TransNation Title Insurance Company for their invaluable assistance.
